publications

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Getting those already within the system to comply has always been one of the loftier hurdles for gender quotas to clear. Some experts have thus maintained enforcement mechanisms (i.e., sanctions) are necessary to compel compliance and are a critical component of a comprehensive and effective gender quota framework. Drawing on more than a half-century of sanction theory and literature, this study discusses the critical differences between deterrence and compellence sanctions, and positive and negative sanctions. Although the most commonly-applied sanction in gender quota frameworks in Africa, this study’s analysis provides evidence that negative compellence sanctions are ineffective at helping quotas reach their minimum target-thresholds while positive compellence sanctions are particularly effective. This study further clarifies the extent to which different types of sanctions help gender quotas meet their target-thresholds over time.  

R&R,  Party Politics.  

Walter (1997) and Fearon (2004) both suggested that insurgents should be theoretically easier to coopt in the early stages of conflict given they are almost always comparatively weaker than their government-backed foes. Yet, the empirical record demonstrates peace negotiations are seldom attempted in the early stages of insurgency. Studies have indeed shown time-and-again that negotiating with insurgents is often a distant second choice to absolute military victory for governments, their allies, and patrons. In light of the growing prevalence of counterinsurgency failures and stalemates, this study predicts the most logical time(s) for embattled governments to negotiate peace. Using a dataset of 475 insurgent conflicts (1948-present), this study offers a novel prediction for when they should negotiate. This prediction is bolstered by in-depth qualitative case studies. The conceptual and empirical evidence presented in this study is an exciting breakthrough in the area of peace negotiations. I hope it can help forge a new path for scholars and policymakers focusing on conflict resolution strategies. 

Working Paper. 

This study offers a modest step toward improving our understanding about the effects of war-related violence on the psychology of electoral engagement. Among the universe of states that have experienced war, a long legacy of violence coupled with a fairly new institutionalized electoral process uniquely positions the country of Afghanistan as an excellent unit of analysis for those interested in studying the complex interplay among violence, voter psychology, and election turnout. This study exploits psychological, demographic, and voter turnout data for more than 25,000 Afghans living across the country’s 34 provinces to examine how observed variation in provincial-level violence affected political trust, fear, mortality salience, and voter turnout during the 2018 Wolesi Jirga national election. The goal is to help clarify the nature of these effects by comparing the provincial-level effect sizes for violence-induced fear and MS on political trust and voter turnout.

Under review with Afghanistan. 

It is well known the country of Afghanistan has been mired in a state of perpetual intrastate conflict for roughly the last four-decades. Perhaps somewhat lesser known is the country’s long legacy of violence against women. Although war-related violence surely undermines democratic processes, violence against women perpetuates and reinforces norms of gender inequality and strangles efforts aimed at empowering women as rightful, integral political actors. This study argues the psychological effects of war-related violence and violence against women effects women’s propensity to participate in electoral processes both systematically and as a function of location. Using survey data of more than 17,000 Afghans, I show violence against women mediates the relationship between the psychological measures of engagement and women’s electoral participation;with the greatest effects observed in provinces where violence against women is more prevalent. These results suggest Afghan women’s electoral engagement at the macro-level is a result, at least in part, of the fundamental differences in the prevalence and magnitude of effects of violence against women at the micro-level.

Unpublished manuscript.